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Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity
Problem, and Legal Liability
I. GLENN COHEN*
In her provocative new article in this Issue, Creating Children with
Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic
Interventions, Professor Kirsten Smolensky argues against tort liability
for parents who use assisted reproductive technologies to produce
disabled children-the recurring example she uses is deaf parents
attempting to have a deaf child-when it is accomplished through the
selection of pre-embryos; that is, parents who use in vitro fertilization
(IVF) to produce a number of pre-embryos, use prenatal genetic
diagnosis (PGD) to determine which of the pre-embryos have the
desired disabling trait, and implant only those pre-embryos.
I understand Smolensky's intriguing argument to have the following
structure: (i) Common sense intuitions about morality and the law
suggest that intentionally producing disabled children is harmful to those
children and should enable them to sue in tort for that harm. (2) There
are a series of arguments for nonetheless barring tort suits by children
against their parents in this circumstance that are unpersuasive, namely,
that there is no parental duty on which to base liability, that it would
violate a federal constitutional right to be free from violations of one's
bodily integrity, and that it would violate a federal constitutional right to
make certain parental decisions. (3)(a) An additional argument,
however, drawn from Derek Parfit's "Non-Identity Problem" poses a
real problem for liability. Had the particular pre-embryo not been
selected, the individual who suffers the harm of the disability would not
have existed. As long as the parental intervention does not produce a
child whose "life is not worth living,"' we cannot say the child has been
* Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Kevin Ashby, Dan Brock, Nir Eyal, Dov
Fox, John Goldberg, Bert Huang, Frances Kamm, Adriaan Lanni, Daryl Levinson, Ken Levy, Ben
Roin, Sadath Sayeed, Mark S. Stein, and Talha Syed for helpful comments on earlier versions of this
Article. I also thank Professor Smolensky and the Hastings Law Journal for inviting me to respond to
her article.
I. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 299, 336 (2oo8). This phrase is commonly used
in the literature, although perhaps it would be more accurate to refer to it as having a life worth not
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harmed (i.e., that this child is worse off) because a disabled life is better
than no life at all. Therefore, tort liability should be barred for cases of
intentionally creating disabled children through selection of pre-embryos
(Smolensky calls these "indirect" interventions,' I prefer to call them "by
selection").3 (3)(b) However, if it became possible to genetically modify a
pre-embryo to induce a disability (Smolensky calls these "direct"
interventions,4 I prefer to call them "by genetic manipulation"), then tort
liability for this act should not be barred by reasoning based on the Non-
Identity Problem, because "genetic modification does not involve a
choice between living a differently-abled (or disabled) life and
nonexistence; it is the choice between living a differently-abled life and
living a life absent genetic modification."'
My focus will be on this third claim of Smolensky's in each of its
parts, that reasoning based on the Non-Identity Problem should lead us
to bar tort liability for creating disabled children, but only when it is done
by selection rather than genetic manipulation.
In Part I of this Article I show why I find problematic the arguments
Smolensky offers for distinguishing, for Non-Identity Problem purposes,
cases of creating disabled children through genetic manipulation from
cases of creating disabled children through selection. Her arguments are
premised on the claim that the genetic manipulation cases involve
identity-preserving interventions. I both raise questions about the
specific arguments she offers, and discuss why I am somewhat skeptical
that this is a fruitful line of inquiry to develop for law. More generally, I
show that her argument entails a more dramatic extinguishing of tort
liability than she focuses on.
In Part II, the more constructive Part of this Article, I examine
whether legal liability should be barred even for cases where the Non-
Identity Problem applies. I set out four kinds of approaches drawn from
the bioethics literature that suggest that the parents have acted
wrongfully by creating disabled children notwithstanding the Non-
living. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 359 (rev. ed. 1987); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right
Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1131 n.48 (2oo8); Seanna Valentine Shiffrin,
Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, I IS
(i999). What is usually meant, is that it not be so bad that, if asked ex post, the individual would prefer
never to have come into existence. E.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS
AND JUSTICE 224 (2000); Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17, 45 (2002). Job's lament that "I wish I had died in my
mother's womb" is the classical expression, Job 3:11 (Good News), though what modern authors have
in mind is something more like Lesch-Nyhan syndrome. See, e.g., BUCHANAN ET AL., supra, at 233. 1 will
follow Smolensky in discussing only interventions that do not produce a life worth not living.
2. Smolensky, supra note i, at 300-0o.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 301.
5. Id. at 334.
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Identity Problem. I then offer some tentative views about whether any of
these approaches is a valid basis for legal liability, discussing tort law,
which is Smolensky's focus, and also extending the project beyond tort to
discuss criminal law and other forms of legal regulation.
Before I present those points, however, I want to make a threshold
observation on the first part of Smolensky's argument, the idea that
common sense intuitions about morality (and the law) suggest it is
harmful (and should be tortious) to intentionally produce disabled
children. The point is both terminological and substantive. While
Smolensky discusses creating "children with disabilities," I will from here
on out use the phrase "intentional diminishment," which I will define as
intentionally using reproductive technology to produce a child who is on
balance significantly harmed as compared to the "normal" child (think of
"diminishment" as the antonymic concept to "enhancement," which is
often discussed in the bioethics literature).
In one sense, intentional diminishment is meant to cover a narrower
swath of cases than the ones with which Smolensky's argument is
concerned.6 It is possible that, even putting to one side the "benefit"
associated with coming into existence that is the nub of the Non-Identity
Problem, in some cases the imposition of a disability will not be on
balance harmful, that is, there may be other corresponding benefits
which produces a net welfare gain rather than loss for the child. I suspect
that most parents who engage in intentional diminishment believe this is
what they are doing-when asked deaf parents seeking to create a deaf
child may say that their intent is to benefit the child by making the child
like its parent and enabling the child to participate in Deaf culture in a
way that the child could not if he/she were hearing; that while deafness
carries burdens for this child the benefits it brings are greater still.7 If
6. In another sense, this term could potentially cover a broader swath of cases than the ones that
concern Smolensky. It recognizes that the line between disability, pain, illness, and injury is a fine one
to draw, see, e.g., MARK S. STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY: UTILITARIANISM AGAINST
EGALITARIANISM 23-24 (2oo6), and that from the point of view of commonsense morality it is the harm-
causing nature of the intervention, not the fact that it causes what might be termed a "disability" in the
colloquial sense, which seems to matter. That said, while it is not clear to me how much (if any) of
Smolensky's arguments would change if instead of intentionally creating a "disabled" child one
intentionally created a child with a crippling disease, in what follows I will track her article by using
examples that largely fall within the colloquial meaning of disability: deafness, blindness, paralysis, etc.
The term "intentional diminishment" also acknowledges that not all disabilities are harmful to
the same degree: while the selection of a pre-embryo with red/green color blindness, epilepsy,
deafness, or moderate mental retardation all might be thought of as "creating children with
disabilities," they represent the imposition of very different levels of harm. Moreover, as proponents
of the social model of disability remind us, how harmful a given disability will be is in part a function
of the existing social structure-to use a trivial example, mobility deficits requiring wheelchairs are
less harmful in a world where every building has ramps than one where no building does.
7. In the real case of Sharon Duchesneau and Candy McCullough, a lesbian couple living in
Maryland, both of whom were deaf and sought to produce a deaf child by using a sperm donor with
five generations of deafness in his family, the reasons they gave for their actions were along these
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they are right about this, it is less clear to me that common-sense
morality would lead us to view the action as worthy of condemnation.
Perhaps there are reasons why we think they are wrong about this-for
example, because we think the magnitude of the harm outweighs the
magnitude of the benefit, or that a harm to a health state can never be
outweighed by a benefit in another domain such as community
membership and parental belongingness (a sort of separate spheres
view 9)-but neither of these points are obviously true.
Therefore, even at the level of common-sense morality, the deaf
child case strikes me as a genuinely hard one. It is a case where creating a
disabled child may not be a case of intentional diminishment, that is, it
may not create a child who (putting aside the possible benefits of coming
into existence) is on balance significantly harmed as compared to one
that existed without the impairment. Perhaps a different example would
be clearer; others have used the example of an intervention that
produces a child with moderate mental retardation, '° a case that seems
less likely to leave open the question of whether the child that results is
on balance significantly harmed by the impairment. In any event,
deafness is the example Smolensky has chosen, and for the purposes of
symmetry I will use this example throughout the paper, and just ask
readers to assume, arguendo (as Smolensky seems to assume), that the
child whose parents use reproductive technologies to make it deaf is
(putting aside the possible benefits of coming into existence) significantly
harmed.
I. SELECTION, MANIPULATION, AND THE SCOPE OF THE CLAIMS
EXTINGUISHED BY THE ARGUMENT
Smolensky's argument is focused on barring tort liability for
intentionally producing disabled children (in cases that do not create a
life worth not living), and even then only as to cases where intentional
lines. Margarette Driscoll, Why We Chose Deafness for Our Children, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr.
14, 2002, § 5, at 7. As they put it, "We feel whole as deaf people and we want to share the wonderful
aspects of our deaf community-a sense of belonging and connectedness-with children." Id.
8. Even in a world where everyone spoke sign language, deafness would still prevent access to
goods made possible only by sound-enjoyment of a violin concerto by Tchaikovsky, for example.
That said, deaf adults sometimes refuse cochlear implants, suggesting the choice may not be
completely clear cut, although in these cases the adults have already adapted to their nonhearing state
such that the comparison may not be completely probative.
9. See Dan W. Brock, Separate Spheres and Indirect Benefit, 26 COST EFFECT. & RESOURCE
ALLOC'N 4 (2003), available at http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/pdf/1478-7547-I-4.pdf.
to. See Dan W. Brock, The Nonidentity Problem and Genetic Harms- The Case of Wrongful
Handicaps, 9 BIOErHICS 269, 272-73 (1995). Of course, one thing in favor of the deafness example is
that there have been real cases of parents seeking to create deaf children, while I am unaware of any
case of parents who have tried to use reproductive technology to intentionally produce a child with
mental retardation. This is most likely why Smolensky chose this example.
[Vol. 6o:347
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diminishment is achieved through pre-embryo selection, not genetic
manipulation.
It is worth noting, however, that if Smolensky is right about the Non-
Identity Problem, it actually entails a broader extinguishing of tort suits
by the child in this context than the one she focuses on. Smolensky's use
of the Non-Identity Problem hinges on the conclusion that the resulting
child was not harmed, because a disabled life (at least in cases where it
produces a life worth living) is better than no life at all." The argument
thus turns on the lack of a cognizable harm to the would-be victim.
Therefore, her argument seems to entail extinguishing liability for
parents who act with a benevolent intent (to enable the child to
participate in Deaf culture), a malicious one (the parent simply enjoys
watching children suffer), or even no intention at all, for example, when
diminishment occurs by negligence or simple misfortune.
Because Smolensky's argument turns on the claim that the resulting
child has suffered no cognizable harm, it would seem to also entail
extinguishing tort liability if the tortfeasor is someone other than the
parents. For example, there is still no cognizable harm to the resulting
child in a case where the doctor performing PGD is negligent in
performing the screening, or, worse yet, intentionally misleads the
parents into thinking the pre-embryo in question does not carry the deaf
gene(s) when it in fact does.'2 Nor does it matter whether the result was
achieved through an act or an omission; again, in neither case will the
child suffer a cognizable harm, and therefore, says her argument, there
should not be tort liability.
Smolensky does offer one limiting principle: she draws a clever
distinction between what she calls "direct" and "indirect" production of
disability, between selecting a pre-embryo with deafness amongst a
possible set of pre-embryos, and genetically manipulating a pre-embryo
before implantation to induce deafness (something that is not currently
II. See Smolensky, supra note i, at 336.
12. Recognize, however, that even where the Non-Identity Problem applies, it does not rule out
the possibility that in cases involving diminishment by third parties the parents may still have a suit
against the doctor or other third party. When parents sue the tort is called "wrongful birth," while
when the resulting child sues the tort is called "wrongful life." See, e.g., Wendy F. Hensel, The
Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 142-
43 (2oo5). In a wrongful birth case the parents claim they have been harmed, not that the child has
been, and to the extent the harm is their own (the diminishment of enjoyment they get from not
having a healthy child, the difference in costs between raising this child as opposed to a child without
the impairment) and not derivative of their child's harm, the Non-Identity Problem poses no obstacle
to their claim. See id. As of 2005, however, approximately half of the states refused to recognize
wrongful birth actions, while all but three have refused to recognize wrongful life actions. Id. at 16o-62
nn.I 14 & 122 (collecting cases). While in the intentional diminishment cases Smolensky focuses on,
this kind of liability seems unlikely because the parents have intentionally caused their own injury (if




technologically possible, but might become possible at some future
time).'3 While she thinks that the Non-Identity Problem should bar
liability in the selection case, she does not think it ought to bar liability in
the manipulation case.
The reason she gives for such a distinction is that "PGD does not
alter the identity of the selected embryo; it merely allows parents to
select one genotype over another."' 4 With genetic modification, however,
things may be different. While ordinarily "[t]he conceptus' nuclear DNA
sequence, comprised of DNA coming from the nucleus of its mother's
egg and the nucleus of its father's sperm, remains virtually unchanged
from the moment of conception to the moment of death," in genetic
modification cases one changes the "already existing set of DNA and,
arguably, changes the resulting person's identity."'5 In other words, if
genetic manipulation to induce a disability creates a "change in identity,"
then we are exactly back in the jaws of the Non-Identity Problem, albeit
in a slightly different form; there is no identity (in the sense of
"identical") between the pre- and post-manipulation pre-embryo.'
6
Language almost fails us here, but let me try to put the point this
way. If a genetic modification that induces deafness changes personal
identity, then it cannot be worse for the you who comes into existence
genetically manipulated to be deaf that this intervention occurred,
because, had it not occurred, you as you would not have existed at all,
rather a different person would have existed in your place. Existing in a
diminished state is better than not existing at all, therefore, you have not
been harmed overall. 7 The key question becomes whether the
intentionally diminishing intervention is identity preserving or identity
changing: if we consider the pre- and post-manipulation pre-embryo to
have the same personal identity, to be the same person, then the Non-
Identity Problem creates no obstacle (the comparison is between a
better-off and less-well-off you); if we think the manipulation creates a
change in identity, then the Non-Identity Problem is as much of an
obstacle for the imposition of tort liability as in the diminishment by
selection cases. Which is it?
13. Smolensky, supra note i, at 303.
14. Id. at 301.
15. Id. at 332-33.
i6. To be clear, what Smolensky and I mean by "identity" is "personal identity"-what makes
one the particular person one is-as opposed to other possible senses of identity.
17. Eric Rakowski has captured the point nicely in discussing the opposite problem, whether
there is a duty to engage in genetic manipulation of a deaf pre-embryo to make it hearing:
If a person's genes could not have been better in a certain respect because better genes
would have made him a different person, then it seems that being born with the poorer set
of genes cannot have harmed him, because that poorer set is a precondition of his very
existence.
Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1352 (2002).
[Vol. 6o:347
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There is a vast philosophical literature on identity (with Derek Parfit
being one of the leading contributors) that I cannot even begin to
canvass in this short Article. For present purposes, I merely want to
make two kinds of observations. First, that the two brief arguments that
Smolensky offers for her claim that preimplantation genetic
manipulations that induce a disability such as deafness are identity
preserving rather than identity changing do not seem to prove her claim.
There is also a third argument for her claim we might construct based on
something Smolensky says indirectly. This third argument initially seems
more plausible, but I show why I have some doubts about it as well.'"
Second, I want to explain why I am skeptical that tying the argument to
changes in identity is a profitable way forward for the law that will lead
us to determinate answers.
Smolensky offers two brief arguments for her position. The first
argument borrows a thought experiment from Parfit where:
He writes about a situation where his mother conceives a child a few
seconds later from when she in fact conceived him and he questions
whether this child would have been him. In all likelihood, that few
seconds of time would have resulted in a different sperm reaching his
mother's egg, and as a result he would have shared at least 50% of the
same DNA with the child. Parfit suggests that it is impossible to know
whether this child, one that shares at least 50% of his DNA, would
have been him. Under this view, genes play a relatively small role in
creating a person's identity.'9
It is not at all obvious to me how this example proves the claim that
genetic modifications that induce disabilities do not change the person's
identity. Rather than proving the point, this seems like a reductio of the
argument. Fraternal (or dizygotic) twins share 50% of their genes,"
although they are conceived simultaneously, and yet no one thinks they
are the same person. If her argument requires one to accept that I would
still be me rather than someone else (i.e., that my identity would be
preserved) had I undergone a genetic modification while a pre-embryo
that altered my genetic make-up by 5o%, such that I was now the genetic
equivalent of a fraternal twin to my prior self, for many that would be a
good reason to reject the argument.'
i8. To be clear, even if I am successful in showing that the arguments Smolensky advances for her
own position are unpersuasive, that does not rule out the possibility that there may be other
arguments out there for her distinction that do succeed.
i9. Smolensky, supra note i, at 333-34 (footnotes omitted).
20. E.g., Laura A. Baker, The Biology of Relationships: What Behavioral Genetics Tells Us About
Interactions Among Family Members, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 837, 838 (2007).
21. Moreover, as Smolensky notes, Parfit himself is unsure about this claim, and recognizes that if
the time gap had been a month not seconds the two possible children would not share the same
identity. Smolensky, supra note i, at 334 n.194. While some might think that "if the child is born at a
different time and experiences a different personal history from some other potential child," that may
play a role in changing the child's identity, that conclusion does not mandate that it is the only thing
December 2008]
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To be clear, I do not think that Smolensky's claim (that deafening a
pre-embryo is not identity changing) requires us to accept that a 50%
alteration in pre-embryonic genetic make-up would leave personal
identity undisturbed, it is just this argument that she offers for that claim
which seems to push in that direction. In any event, even if this argument
should be rejected it usefully clarifies something about Smolensky's
claim that is implicit in her discussion but never stated directly: her claim
is not that no genetic modification one could effect on a pre-embryo
would be sufficient to change identity in the sense relevant to the Non-
Identity Problem; rather, her claim is that while some genetic
modifications could change identity in the relevant sense, those that
induce disabilities are not among them. 3 However, to pick up a theme I
will develop at the end of this Part, once one accepts that some amount
of genetic change (50% genotype alteration? 90%?) can change identity,
one faces the need to specify why that change suffices and not another,
why difference of being deaf versus not deaf is insufficient, and so on.
Recognizing that many readers may find that her initial
"hypothetical is unpersuasive," Smolensky offers a second argument:
[T]ake the case of two genetically identical twins. Most readers would
accept that twins have unique identities and are different persons even
if they are genetically identical. If genes are only a small part of a
person's identity as these two hypotheticals suggest, then it cannot be
that could change identity; indeed many think that changes in time of birth add to but do not supplant
genetic changes in their effects on personal identity. See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 17, at 1368.
22. Such a view would not be unprecedented. In the context of genetic modification, Christopher
Belshaw has noted (though not argued for) such a view, what we might call the biological view of
identity, which he associates with the work of Saul Kripke. See Christopher Belshaw, Identity and
Disability, 17 J. APPLIED PHIL. 263, 264-66 (2ooo). On this view the meeting of a particular sperm and
egg is not only necessary for the formation of a particular personal identity, but it is sufficient, such
that any genetic modification of the resulting entity thereafter does not disturb identity (or, on one
variation, at least so long as the modification does not make the entity not human). Id. at 265-66. My
purpose here is not to evaluate the biological view. For critiques, see, for example, id. at 265-66, 268-
69, and David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. ed. 2oo8), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-
ethics/. Rather, my purpose is just to note that it stands in opposition to the psychological Parfitian
view of identity to which Smolensky appears drawn. See Belshaw, supra, at 273. Further, the biological
view would entail that no genetic modification can change identity, which is a claim it appears
Smolensky has rejected.
23. The closest Smolensky comes to saying this outright is when she writes "[b]ut to argue that
changing a single gene, even a gene that controls for a central component of one's identity, always
results in the creation of a different person seems to place too much emphasis on genetics."
Smolensky, supra note i, at 333 (emphasis added). The words in italics hint that this is Smolensky's
position, but in any event Smolensky has confirmed to me that this is her position in correspondence.
To make a slightly different point, it would seem from the statement above that Smolensky
draws something from the fact that it was a "single" gene that was changed. I, however, am not sure
why the amount of genotypic change is what matters. There can be large genotypic changes that result
in a small phenotypic differences and vice versa, and it seems plausible to me that my expressed traits
(i.e., phenotype), not my genotype, play the larger role in what is essential to my personal identity.
[Vol. 6o:347
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true that altering a single gene in an embryo's DNA necessarily results
in the creation of a different person. 4
Unfortunately, this second argument also seems unpersuasive. The
example only shows that two individuals can develop different personal
identities even though they were born with (almost) identical genes; that
does not show that if two possible individuals were born with different
genes they would develop the same personal identity.25 It is this second
claim that Smolensky's argument seems to be reaching towards, but
given the truth of the first claim, the second claim could be either true or
false.
Both arguments are extremely brief, so perhaps there is more here
than I am seeing, yet as I understand them, neither of the arguments
presented persuade. But Smolensky seems to also gesture, offhandedly,
at a different kind of argument. In explaining her position she observes
that "[w]hile deafening a hearing child may cause the child to have
different life experiences, it does not create a different person.2 6 From
this comment we can try and construct a third argument, that while the
arguments she offers may not be persuasive, rejecting her position leaves
us in a still more problematic position: it implies that there ought also to
be no harm if we deafened an adult, for example, because that would
create a new identity who could only exist because the old identity
ceased to be. That conclusion is absurd, and to the extent rejecting her
position entails accepting that conclusion, this offers a good reason not to
reject her position. This is a tempting argument, but in my view it too
does not prove her claim, because the adult case differs from the genetic
manipulation case in important ways, such that rejecting her claim does
not require us to accept the conclusion that deafening an adult is not
harmful.
First, one might argue that the intervention in the adult case is
identity preserving, but because of a different basis for the continuity of
identity, for present purposes let us call it psychological continuity
through memory. The individual postdeafening would remember his
predeafened state, and can experience emotional harms connected to
comparisons of the pre- and post-intervention states, specifically the
feeling of loss. This same basis of identity continuity is not available in
the pre-embryo manipulation case, because pre-embryos do not
experience their unmanipulated state; indeed given that pre-embryos
24. Id. at 334 (footnote omitted).
25. More particularly, it does not prove that if two possible individuals were born with the
difference in genes that would cause one of them to have a disability but not the other, they would
always develop the same personal identity.
26. Smolensky, supra note i, at 334.
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lack even a rudimentary nervous system, they do not experience
anything.27
But what about the case of deafening a very young child, say, a four-
day-old? I may not remember myself before that time. Does that mean
that if I was deafened at that age, that intervention is identity changing
and not identity preserving, such that I have not been harmed? What this
case suggests is that the specification of the condition(s) giving rise to
identity continuity must be made more precise. Psychological continuity
in the form of continuity of memory, a view that originates with John
Locke,s may not be required, only a lesser requirement of continuity of
"conscious experiences" even if those experiences "fall short of the more
complex type of self-awareness adults regularly experience." 9 Rakowski
associates a view of this kind with Jeff McMahan, "that an individual's
existence as a moral person begins in the womb, during the last two or three
months of a normal pregnancy, when neural activity, which is associated
27. See, e.g., Report of the Cal. Advisory Comm. on Human Cloning, Cloning Californians?, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1191 (2002) (stating that "[t]he development of a nervous system and any
possibility of feeling sensations comes much later than the appearance of the primitive streak[,]" which
occurs at approximately fourteen days of development).
28. See i JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 449 (1984) ("[A]s far as
this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the
identity of that Person; it is the same self now as it was then; and 'tis by the same self with this present
one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); see
also Mary Ford, The Personhood Paradox and the 'Right to Die,' 13 MEO. L. REV. 80, 87-90 (2005).
29. See Rakowski, supra note 17, at 1383 n.65. The other alternative would be to accept that "the
slight cognitive links between a newborn and the disabled person he may or may not become are too
meager to justify regarding the two as a single person," id. at 1383, such that there is not identity
continuity. This view, which Rakowski thinks is implied by Parfit's own work, id., would entail the
conclusion that no harm has been done by deafening a four day old, although the same would not be
true if one deafened an older child with greater cognitive development or an adult.
Because many might find this conclusion as to the four day old problematic, in the text I
explain why rejecting Smolensky's view does not require accepting this conclusion. For present
purposes, I remain agnostic as to which of these standards is either necessary or sufficient for the
continuity of identity. It is worth noting, however, that in other domains of law, some have suggested
that memory continuity is a necessary condition for identity continuity. I am thinking of a kind of
change in identity that has nothing to do with genetics and may in fact involve fully formed adults: the
man who suffers severe retrograde amnesia or brain damage such that he has no memory of who he
was before. Ought we think of him as a "new" person, who should not enjoy either the burden or
benefits of the one who he was before? In the case where the "old" person committed a crime, this
problem has greatly interested criminal law theorists. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY
MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 103-13 (1987); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Stephen
Behnke, Criminal Law and Multiple Personality Disorder- The Vexing Problems of Personhood and
Responsibility, 1o S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 277, 286-89 (2OOI). Such cases are not merely hypothetical, as
Leo Katz has suggested that something of this sort occurred in the case of Rudolph Hess, a high-
ranking Nazi tried at Nuremberg who initially pled amnesia. See KATZ, supra, at £O8-IO. If we believe
that in these circumstances the amnesiac should not be punished on retributivist grounds that suggests
that memory continuity really is a necessary condition for identity continuity. On the other hand, it is
also possible that the conditions for the continuity of identity may not be general but instead context
specific to particular legal and moral inquiries. If so, it might be a mistake to move too quickly from
intuitions in one context to another.
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with rudimentary subjective experience, first occurs in a fetus's brain," and
that only from that point is there identity continuity.3" If one accepted a
view like this, that would suggest that while the Non-Identity Problem may
present a difficulty for concluding that harm has been done through a
genetic modifications performed on a pre-embryo (which has no nervous
system yet), it will pose no such difficulty in concluding that harm has
been done when a comparable intervention is performed on a late-stage
fetus. Further, accepting a view like this would allow one to distinguish
the case of deafening a four day old and genetically manipulating a pre-
embryo to be deaf: unless one thought one could have conscious
experiences before one had even a primitive nervous system, there does
not seem to be this kind of continuity between one's adult self and one's
pre-embryonic 'self.'
To make a separate but related point, on some normative ethics
views there is a morally significant distinction between losing what one
has, and never having it in the first place, and in this regard there is
something special about the genetic case in that "no one is harmed in not
being created, because there is no one to be harmed if we do not create
someone.' 3' This distinction offers one reason why we treat killing
someone and failing to create them as so morally different, in the former
someone loses something good that they have (life) while in the latter
there is no one to be harmed if we do not create them. Similarly, one
might think it is different to come into existence never being able to hear,
as opposed to losing one's hearing once one had it.3" For these reasons I
do not think that the case of deafening an adult or a child poses a
problem for rejecting Smolensky's claim.33
30. Rakowski, supra note 17, at 1383 n.65 (citing Jeff McMahan, Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the
Morality of Causing People to Exist, in RATIONAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS FOR
GREGORY KAVKA 208, 2II (Jules L. Coleman & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1998)).
31. F.M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 72 (2001-
2002); cf Thomas Nagel, Death, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 1, 1-10 (1979) (justifying why we regret dying
young, but not the failure to be born earlier, on the ground that only the former constitutes losing
something good that we had).
32. Of course, some faiths believe that there already is a person who exists in the pre-embryonic
state, see, for example, Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Ambiguous Meaning of Human Conception, 4o U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 199, 223-25 (2oo6), who is losing something good (the potential for hearing). This
argument, however, does not seem available to Smolensky, for it would imply that the pre-embryo
who has not been selected is also a person who has lost out on something good, the ability to live, such
that there is a harm in the selection cases as well, which she denies. More generally, adopting such a
view would counsel much more profound restrictions on reproductive technology use than I suspect
Smolensky would endorse.
33. A different way of seeing this point, at least for those who believe that there exists some
genetic manipulation that would be sufficient to change identity, is as follows: take whatever
manipulation, however radical it is you believe would change personal identity if done to a pre-embryo
(for example, one that induces a total loss of all sensory modalities except touch). Now ask whether
you think there would be harm done if we intentionally acted to put an adult in the same state (e.g., a
blow to his sensory cortex). The answer seems to be yes. However, if this argument were right, it
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This leads me to the skeptical part of my analysis. While I have
shown why Smolensky's arguments do not prove that genetic
manipulations producing deafness or other disabilities are identity
preserving, I have not proven that these interventions are always identity
changing. Instead, it seems plausible to me that genetic manipulations
are quite heterogeneous and the line between identity preserving and
identity changing interventions is unlikely to map onto the line between
genetic manipulations and other sorts of interventions. That is, it seems
plausible that not all genetic manipulations will change personal
identity-imagine a small manipulation that adds a Marilyn Monroe
beauty mark above the lip where none would otherwise have been 34-but
other manipulations do seem to change the identity of the entity-
imagine we replace 75% of your DNA with Donkey DNA to create a
human-Donkey hybrid. In between is a vast spectrum of manipulations
that produce very hard questions as to the continuity of identity. Even if
there were continuity of identity between a deaf-born version of yourself
and one that was not deaf-born, as Smolensky argues, what if we added
blindness to the mix? Now add mental retardation?35 If we also flipped
your X-chromosome for a Y-chromosome and changed your gender (a
nondisabling form of genetic manipulation)? And so on. To produce an
argument along these lines one would have to specify, within the class of
genetic manipulations, which kinds of genetic manipulations are identity
preserving and why, an extremely difficult task.6
If the mere existence of line-drawing problems, of hard cases, was
enough to doom the endeavor, then that would be the end of attempts to
formulate almost any legal rule. But the problem here is not merely that
there may be hard cases, but that most cases of "creating disabled
children," the cases (unlike the beauty mark) where from a policy/legal
perspective we care about the answer, are likely to fall within this
difficult area where it will be difficult to determine whether personal
identity has changed. Of course, I can simply assert that a particular
would be impossible to believe that the intervention was identity changing when done to a pre-embryo
but harmful when done to an adult. That is, however, exactly what we do believe, which suggests the
argument is wrong.
34. There may also be other genetic manipulations that result in no phenotypic changes at all.
35. If one accepts that some genetic modifications will be identity changing and some will not be,
one intriguingly counterintuitive result is that the more severe the disability imposed, the more likely
identity will be changed. If, as Smolensky would argue, in the pre-embryonic case where identity has
changed we ought to bar tort liability, then the imposition of more severe disabilities produce the
weakest case for liability at least on the ground of harm to the child. That said, for some of the
arguments offered in Part 11 (which do not depend on harm to the resulting child), the strength of the
argument for imposing liability grows with the severity of the imposed disability, that is, in the
expected direction. See infra Part II.
36. See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 17, at 1351 ("[l~t can be difficult to resolve whether genetically
caused conditions that are present from birth and frequently have an enormous impact on people's
lives, such as blindness or deafness, result in a change in identity.").
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genetic manipulation was identity changing, but it is not clear to me how
we would know if I was "right." Claims about who we might have been
had we been different people may give rise to intuitions, but whatever
one's attitude towards the role of intuitions in moral reasoning generally,
the basis for these specific intuitions seem particularly suspect. It is not
clear to me from what experiential data I could possibly know if I would
have been the same person deaf and not deaf, and I worry that these
arguments are unproveable and unfalsefiable. For these reasons, from a
legal perspective the game may not be worth the candle.37
In sum, Smolensky's argument entails a broad extinguishing of tort
liability, barring suit by the child against any person (parent, doctor, etc.)
for any culpability based on any preimpla ntation act or omission that
leads to diminishment. I find unpersuasive the arguments she offers for
cabining her claim by distinguishing diminishment through genetic
manipulation from diminishment through selection. More generally, I am
skeptical about whether this kind of argument can provide a promising
basis for distinctions in normative ethics or legal liability.
In what follows, I put to one side the question of whether the Non-
Identity Problem applies in the genetic modification cases. Instead I ask,
for cases where the problem does apply (selection cases, for certain),
what are the implications for legal liability more generally. Here I
examine Smolensky's claim that the Non-Identity Problem, where
applicable, should eradicate tort liability for suits by the child against his
or her parent, and also extend the project to consider other kinds of legal
liability.
II. LEGAL LIABILITY NOTWITHSTANDING THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
Smolensky treats the invocation of the Non-Identity Problem, where
it applies, as a conclusive reason to bar tort liability in suits by children
against those who caused their diminished state. In this Part, I want to
examine more closely what effect the Non-Identity Problem, where
applicable, ought to have on legal liability. I set out four kinds of
arguments drawn from the bioethics literature that suggest that the
parents have acted wrongfully by engaging in intentional diminishment,
even if we accept the objection of the Non-Identity Problem and its
conclusion that the resulting child has not been harmed overall. Two of
the arguments are more consequentialist (non-person-affecting principle
and other-person-affecting principle approaches), while two are more
37. I also worry that our intuitions about whether an intervention is identity changing are being
driven by our intuitions as to whether we want to find liability, rather than vice versa. Cf Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 643-44 (1982) (making a
similar point as to the relationship between determining decision-making capacity and the decision
whether to overrule a patient's refusal of treatment).
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nonconsequentialist (virtue ethics and wronging without overall harming
approaches). This list may not be exhaustive. For each of these
arguments I then move from wrongfulness to liability and look at
whether the argument would provide a basis for legal liability in the
intentional diminishment case, and what form that liability could take
(tort and beyond). I should preface this discussion by noting that my goal
in this short Article is not to evaluate or even fully elaborate these
possible families of arguments; some are arguments that I myself would
not pursue because of more general normative ethics commitments, but
others with different priors may find these arguments attractive. My
modest ambition is merely to start mapping the conceptual space, and
begin a conversation about what the Non-Identity Problem means and
does not mean from a legal perspective.
A. NON-PERSON-AFFECTING PRINCIPLES AND SAME NUMBER
SUBSTITUTIONS
The Non-Identity Problem is an obstacle for any argument that says
intentional diminishment is harmful because it harmed the child that is
produced-that is, for any argument premised on the idea that "the
individuals who experience suffering and limited opportunity in one
alternative exist without those effects in the other alternative.
538
However, there is a separate family of what are sometimes called "non
person-affecting principles" which may be used to condemn the action.39
One such view suggests the world would be better off if instead of person
A who will experience serious suffering or limited opportunity coming
into existence, person B who will not experience those things came into
existence-that is, "[a]lthough the person born with the condition in
question would not have been harmed by birth, the world is better off if a
person without that harm had been substituted in his place."'4 Thus, on
the non-person-affecting principle-"[i]t is morally good to act in a way
that results in less suffering and less limited opportunity in the world,""
and therefore morally bad to act in way that results in more of those
things-the parent who purposefully produces a child who will
experience serious suffering or limited opportunity has done something
morally wrong. To put the point in welfarist terms, if one assumes that
38. Brock, supra note io, at 273.
39. See, e.g., id. at 272-73. Parfit himself introduces non-person-affecting principles of the same
number variety immediately after presenting the Non-Identity Problem. PARFrr, supra note i, at 359-
61, 364-65. "Non person-affecting" may be a bit of a misnomer in that the suffering that is diminishing
welfare will be experienced by some person-it is not disembodied, it is just that the principle does not
require the same person to suffer or not suffer based on the counterfactual; the relevant distinction is
between same number and same person cases. Brock, supra note to, at 273.
40. John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM.
J.L. & MED. 7, 16 (2004).
41. Brock, supra note io, at 273.
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the undiminished child will have higher welfare than the diminished one,
then global welfare is maximized (and the world is better) when the
undiminished child comes into existence, and any intervention ought to
be keyed to creating a situation where the undiminished (rather than
diminished) child comes into existence.
On its face, however, the non-person-affecting principle approach
has a built-in limitation: it applies only to "same number" cases, cases
where the same number of persons exist in either counterfactual and we
merely substitute the undiminished (higher welfare) person for the
diminished (lower welfare) person.4" In "same number" cases the choice
is between the coming into existence of one child in either scenario, and
the question is whether it will be the diminished or the undiminished
child. But not all cases are "same number" cases. Consider a case where,
because of their genetic make up two parents are "virtually certain to
genetically transmit the disability to any child they conceive" such that
"[i]f they choose not to have a child with a disability and can have no
other child instead, the result is one fewer child[]-a different-number
case."43 In such a case, what is best is that the disabled child comes into
existence, because from this perspective, the existence of a disabled child
is better than the existence of no child whatsoever (again assuming it has
a life worth living). However, the application of non-person-affecting
principles in different number cases may lead to problematic results.'
42. PARFrr, supra note i, at 36o-65; Brock, supra note io, at 273.
43. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note i, at 255. This example given by Buchanan and his coauthors
usefully illustrates the difficulty in determining exactly what is a different number case. Suppose that it
is only the combination of both parents' genetic material that produces the disabled child, could they
not avoid that result by using one of their gametes along with sperm or egg donated from a third
party? Even if they each had genetic material certain to produce the disability, could they not still
produce another healthy child with the mother serving as gestational parent using both donated sperm
and egg? John Robertson has suggested that even in cases like these where we could make same-
number substitutions, we may want to make an exception and not treat the failure to substitute as
wrongful if it "unreasonably burden[s] parents," and has suggested as examples cases where "[t]o
substitute a healthy child would require that the parents give up having a genetically related child and
accept childlessness, adoption, or use of a gamete donor." Robertson, supra note 40, at 17. Whether
we ought to make an exception for such cases would depend, in part, on prior normative judgments
about the value of having genetically related children. See Cohen, supra note i, at i i89-9o (discussing
this issue).
44. The problem is that when applied to different number cases, the non-person-affecting
principle approach appears to lead to what Parfit has called "The Repugnant Conclusion," the idea
that what would be best from the non-person-affecting standpoint is to produce a very large number of
children who had lives just above the threshold of a "life not worth living," since the existence of each
additional child might increase total happiness by vastly increasing the population, even though we
make every already existing person much worse off. See PARFrr. supra note i, at 387-9o; see also
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note I, at 254. Some have suggested that the problems can be overcome by
relying on average rather than total utility as a measure of what makes a state of the world better. See
Robertson, supra note 40, at 16-17. Others think that this problem shows that non-person-affecting
principles alone cannot be the stuff which normative judgments are made of, and instead that what is
required is an as-yet-unarticulated comprehensive theory of how person and non-person-affecting
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It might be tempting to think that all cases of intentional
diminishment, whether done by selection or manipulation, are same
number cases. From the point of view of moral theory, this seems correct.
The test of whether we are in a same number case is whether the parents
could have substituted an undiminished child for the diminished one,
which by definition they could in intentional diminishment cases. From
the point of view of using non-person-affecting principles to motivate
legal rules (more on that below), however, the ex ante perspective seems
more important, and perhaps the question should subtly shift to what
would the parents have done if the law prevented them from producing
disabled children. From that perspective, it seems that not all intentional
diminishment cases are same number cases. Suppose the deaf parents say
they will only conceive a child if it can be deaf (using either selection or
genetic modification). In such a case, although the parents could have
conceived a hearing child instead (and thus their decision not to do so
was wrongful according to the non-person-affecting principle), if the
legal rule prevents them from intentionally creating a deaf child, that rule
will lead them not to have any child at all, which is not better on non-
person-affecting grounds. Thus, in determining whether a legal
intervention to prevent parents from undertaking intentional
diminishment is justified on this principle, we would need to know for
how many parents the introduction of the legal rule will cause them to
(i) substitute an undiminished child, versus (2) refrain from having a (or
a further) child. We would also need a theory of how to value each of
these two possibilities, in order to determine how to trade them off in
terms of what would be welfare promoting.45
A still deeper question as to this approach to the problem is whether
legal liability is appropriately motivated by non-person-affecting
principles at all.46 Tort and criminal liability typically focus on cases
principles interact. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note I, at 254-55.
45. Of course, diminishment and the number of children one has could also interact in much more
complex ways-for example, it may be that the extra resources required to raise a diminished child
means you can only afford to raise one such child, but if instead you had undiminished children, you
could afford to have two. Moreover, if the legal rule causes the couple to adopt rather than have a
child genetically related to them, how ought we to evaluate the benefit to the adopted child from an all
things considered point of view?
46. 1 will highlight one other problem with the non-person-affecting principle approach that goes
to its suitability as a basis for moral wrongfulness: the difficulty it poses for drawing a line between a
duty to avoid diminishment and a duty to engage in enhancement. For additional critiques, see,
Rakowski, supra note 17, at 1371-88. If it would be better to avoid acts or omissions that produce
diminished children with reduced welfare, it would also seem to be better to engage in acts or
omissions that produce children with improved welfare, that is enhancements. Thus, the philosopher
Julian Savulescu argues for a "moral obligation to have the best children" that he calls the principle of
"Procreative Beneficience," that is, "couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the
possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the
others, based on the relevant available information." Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why
We Should Select the Best Children, i5 BioETHics 413. 415 (2ooi). Savulescu himself seems to
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where the behavior of one person sets back the interests of a person or
set of persons, and we want to deter the harmful conduct, compensate
the harmed party, or both. On non-person-affecting principles, that is not
our goal; our goal is to bring about outcomes that would be better in a
global welfarist sense, even if they are not better for any existing person.
For that reason, I am skeptical that this approach can ground legal
liability.
B. OTHER-PERSON-AFFECTING PRINCIPLES
A different response is to suggest that while the Non-Identity
Problem depends on the idea that the child has not been harmed by
being born, that does not mean that others have not been harmed. I call
this family of arguments "other-person-affecting principles." As a first
cut, we might divide this family of arguments into two types: third-party-
effects arguments (a kind of externality argument) and "modified
experience" or "corruption" type arguments.
Third-party-effects arguments are a familiar category for legal
scholars. Very few actions are truly private; they will almost always
impose costs or benefits on others. Intentional diminishment is no
exception: "generally the birth of a child with a profound disability will
be worse, either economically or emotionally, for other people than the
birth of a child who lacks the disability."47 These negative effects might
take the form of placing burdens on the public fisc. For example, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") requires the
federal government to fund state and local agencies to ensure
"appropriate" education for the disabled "to meet their unique needs." 48
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") forbids state
and local governments from denying to a "qualified individual with a
disability" participation in or the benefits of "the services, programs, or
equivocate in stating the principle between choosing/enhancing a child with the "the best life" and one
with "at least as good a life as the others," but the logic of the non-person-affecting principle and his
argument suggests it really is a moral obligation to have the best possible children. Brock, and his later
coauthors, by contrast, suggest a more restrained non-person-affecting principle, an obligation to
avoid creating children who will "experience serious suffering or limited opportunity," Brock, supra
note io, at 273 (emphasis added), or "experience serious suffering or limited opportunity or serious
loss of happiness or good," BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 249 (emphasis added). Most attempts to
draw a line between avoiding diminishment and obligating enhancement either focus on a claim that
some enhancements are not good for the child (to the extent it allows parents to hegemonically
foreclose certain avenues for the child instead of securing a "right to an open future"), the claim that
the availability of enhancements problematically exacerbate inequalities between those who have
access to enhancing technologies and those who do not, or the claim that enhancements impose
externalities on third parties. See generally id. at 156-203. Whether these distinctions work, and
whether they work for all kinds of enhancements, is a question I leave for another day.
47. See Rakowski, supra note 17, at 1370, 1382-83.
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(i)(A) (2oo6); see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-84 (1982);
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3 d 816, 82o-21 (8th Cir. 1999).
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activities of a public entity," for instance by requiring a state courthouse
to have an elevator.49 Intentional diminishment may also place burdens
on private employers, for example under the accommodations
requirements of Title III of the ADA. ° Even within a family, intentional
diminishment may impose substantial burdens on other family members.
In the mundane case, the birth of an intentionally diminished child may
require large amounts of caretaking investment by parents, reducing the
amount of time available for existing children in the family. In the
extreme case it may require a sibling to undergo bone marrow
transplants or other invasive surgery to help the diminished sibling
survive, or face the guilt of being responsible for one's sibling's demise.'
Because they do not rely on harm to the child, but instead the
imposition of harms to others, an argument for liability premised on the
negative third-party effects caused by intentional diminishment evades
the Non-Identity Problem. The argument does confront a different
problem in that we attach a high value to reproductive autonomy, and
allow individuals to make reproductive choices in the ordinary case even
when it imposes costs on others. Smolensky, however, has argued that
the cases of intentional diminishment are special in this regard such that,
at least as a federal constitutional matter, government regulation through
tort liability or other means to prevent these activities will not violate a
protected autonomy right.53 For the purposes of this Article I will just
assume, arguendo, that Smolensky is correct in this claim.54
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12133 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 53-18 (2004).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12152(b)(5)(A); see, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477-79
(I999).
5 1. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell
Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 330-36 (2003) (discussing real life
versions of these "savior sibling" cases and the bioethics issues posed).
52. Of course, third-party effects can be positive as well as negative. If deaf parents or others also
receive a benefit when a deaf rather than hearing child comes into existence, that too has to be
factored into an all things considered welfarist evaluation.
53. Smolensky, supra note I, at 306-08,325-30.
54. For another argument suggesting that the right to engage in intentional diminishment is not
part of what the Constitution protects as "procreative liberty," see, JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE 170-71 (1994). It is not clear whether Smolensky is making only a claim about what the
Constitution actually protects or also a normative claim about what she thinks it (or common law, or
statutory law) should protect. An argument for legal liability on this or many of the other theories
discussed would, of course, require defeating both the normative and positive law versions of the
autonomy argument.
A separate unresolved problem is how to square this approach with the fact that most of us
accept the costs imposed by these statutes in the mundane case where they require us to accommodate
an already existing person who has a disability. Perhaps we can draw a distinction between a duty to
accommodate a disability when it is beyond someone's control versus taking steps to prevent the
disability from happening at all? This would lead to interesting questions about what our obligations
should be to someone who intentionally or negligently acted in such a way to bring about a disability
in themselves, which in turn interfaces with a burgeoning literature on responsibility for health states.
See, e.g., Dan Wikler, Personal and Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 47, 49-55
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Is the third-party-effects-based argument an appropriate basis for
legal liability? It is beyond cavil that the prevention of negative third-
party effects can serve as the basis for criminalizing certain conduct; such
an argument is frequently offered as a justification for banning certain
"victimless" crimes such as gambling and drug use.55 Such an argument
might also justify an action pursued by the government to recover the
costs for the public fisc, which would ensure that the tortfeasor
compensates the correct victim-those who bear the burdens of the
negative third-party effects. 6 That said, because third-party effects are so
pervasive, we will always face the question of how much harm of this
kind must arise before we take action, whether in the form of criminal
liability or other interventions.
In civil remedial design, in the name of deterrence, we sometimes
tolerate a less exact fit between who may bring suit and who deserves
compensation; the idea of a private attorney general, for example in the
form of a qui tam False Claims Act suit or the citizen suit provisions of
many environmental statutes, presupposes that a plaintiff who brings suit
to vindicate the public deterrence function will line her own pocket,
notwithstanding the fact that she was no more aggrieved than anyone
else by the bad conduct. 7 A kind of private attorney general scheme
might also be available here.
Could a third-party-effects argument justify a suit by the resulting
child against its parents within the boundaries of ordinary tort law? It is
commonplace to think of tort as having both a compensatory and
(2002).
55. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman. Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 756-57 (2002);
Mariano-Florentino Cu611ar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering
and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 365 n.214. Of course,
"victimless" is a misnomer in the sense that those who are victimized are those who bear the costs of
the negative third-party effects.
This kind of argument might also give rise to a number of regulatory policies unconnected to
liability. For example, it might lead to a policy to encourage the use of PGD, either by subsidizing
hospitals who buy the necessary equipment, or through state level insurance mandates requiring that
all insurers cover PGD as part of pregnancy coverage, in the hope it will help avoid negligent
diminishment cases.
To be frank, one concern I have with the other-affecting-principle approach is that it might
support an argument for legal regulation to discourage or prevent women from implanting pre-
embryos that are identified as likely to carry disabilities. The existing constitutional jurisprudence
prohibits the state from forcing women to have an abortion in such situations, but as I have suggested
in other work, it is not at all clear that the state faces the same limitations if it tries to intervene before
a pre-embryo has been implanted. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to
Procreate, 6o STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1148-65 (2008).
56. Indeed, in cases where the doctor produces the diminishment, wrongful birth actions by
parents are a form of third-party-effects tort liability. See Hensel, supra note 12, at 141-43.
57. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-and Why It Matters, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2142-56 (2004).
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deterrent function, and to recognize that it is difficult to fully achieve
both simultaneously, such that in order to achieve full deterrence we
must sometimes over-compensate a tort victim. One example is the
awarding of punitive damages in tort cases above what is required for
compensation; those damages are a complete windfall for the particular
plaintiff but are awarded to serve the deterrent function of torts. 9
Allowing a resulting child damages for intentional diminishment
represents a more extreme case: in the punitive damages case the victim
is entitled to one category of damages as compensation but we give him a
second category as a complete windfall in order to ensure the desired
level of deterrence; in this hypothetical action by the child for intentional
diminishment all damages are a windfall since he is the one party who
has not been harmed, and is thus entitled to none of it as compensation.
There is, of course, a pervasive disagreement in tort theory as to whether
the law's conferral of a right of action against a wrongdoer on someone
other than a victim of the wrong is properly considered to be tort law at
all. While corrective justice and civil recourse theorists believe that it is
an essential element of tort "that the defendant must make his or her
payment to the plaintiff, and not simply to the state, the attorney, or some
other party," efficient deterrence and certain other tort theorists
(especially those in law and economics) do not in principle care "whether
the payment is made to the plaintiff or to someone else-all that matters is
that the defendant is forced to part with the money, not who receives it"
and they are thus willing to tolerate a more radical uncoupling of
deterrence and compensation in tort. 6° I have no illusion of resolving that
58. See, e.g., Robert A. Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing: When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim
Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 547, 584 n.19i (2003) ("[T]o achieve optimal deterrence,
tortfeasors must bear the full costs of their risky behavior, even if this overcompensates the occasional
tort victim."); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 553-56
(2005).
59. On the other hand, there is a debate as to whether punitive damages should really be part of
tort at all, or whether we should instead view it as something like "crimtorts." See, e.g., Thomas H.
Koenig, Crimtorts: A Cure for Hardening of the Categories, 17 WIDENER L.J. 733, 739-40 (20o8).
Moreover, a recent line of Supreme Court cases, culminating in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, have
required an increasingly tight fit between the amounts of punitive and compensatory damages
awarded in order to pass muster under the Federal Constitution's Due Process Clause. 549 U.S. 346
(2007). The many statutory actions giving plaintiffs multiple damages-for instance, the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Protection Act, and the Magnuson-
Moss Consumer Warranty Act-offer another example of the same idea. See Koenig, supra, at 776
n.i68. Still another example comes from civil rights cases in which some of the circuits have explicitly
upheld awards of punitive damages even in the absence of actual damages. See, e.g., Cush-Crawford v.
Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 357-59 (2d Cir. 2OOl) (Title VII); Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3 d 419, 430-
34 (3d Cir. 2000) (Fair Housing Act); Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d ioo8, I0o
(7th Cir. 1998) (Title VII). Of course, these are statutory actions, not common law tort.
6o. See, e.g., Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEo. L.J. 695, 700-02
(2003) (emphasis added): see also John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1335-36 (2003) (civil recourse).
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debate here, and will just note that one's position on this debate will in
part determine whether one believes that a suit by the child against his
parents for intentional diminishment in these circumstances is• 6,
appropriate on the third-party-effects rationale.
Third-party-effects-based arguments are only one kind of other-
person-affecting-principle-type argument; a different strand departs
from what, in the area of commodification, I have called "corruption,"
and Professor Altman has called "modified-experience" arguments.
The idea is that permitting a technology or a kind of exchange to be used
might "do violence, 63 or "denigrate" our views of how goods are
properly valued; that they may alter our sensibilities in a way that leads
us to "regard each other as objects with prices rather than as persons.,
6
,
In an essay directed primarily towards cloning, Leon Kass offers
ideas that might be characterized along these lines, expressing his fear
that increased use of these technologies wear down "the wisdom of
repugnance. ' 66 "Repugnance," he argues,
revolts against the excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to
transgress what is unspeakably profound. Indeed, in this age in
which ... our given human nature no longer commands respect, in
which our bodies are regarded as mere instruments of our autonomous
rational wills, repugnance may be the only voice left that speaks up to
defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are the souls that
have forgotten how to shudder.
67
Among other things, Kass laments how reproductive technologies such
as cloning (but we might add IVF and PGD) turn "procreation into
manufacture," and that such technologies (in which the manufacturer
61. Even for those who are comfortable with uncoupling deterrence and compensation, nothing
in the argument requires that we single out the disabled child as the one who ought to have standing to
serve as the vehicle to ensure optimal deterrence, as opposed to any other plaintiff. Indeed, as the one
person who was not harmed, there is a good argument for not using the disabled child in this fashion.
The best argument I can think of for singling out the disabled child as the one to bring these suits is
pragmatic, that the child has the best access to the information needed to bring forth the claim. But
this does not seem particularly persuasive. There is a countervailing risk that the child is less likely to
bring suit than other possible litigants because doing so entails disrupting the family relationship, in
which case a different arrangement might produce better deterrence. It might also be thought of as
particularly awkward for the child to bring suit to vindicate the claim that her existence poses undue
costs on others.
62. See Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 294-97 (99); I.
Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification
Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 691-92 (2003).
63. Cohen, supra note 62, at 698-99.
64. Id. at 691.
65. Altman, supra note 62, at 295.
66. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 3, 19 (Leon R.
Kass & James Q. Wilson eds., 1998). 1 am not sure Kass would himself frame his arguments as
"modified-experience" or "corruption" ones, though I think they lend themselves to this approach. In




"stands above [the creation] not as an equal but as a superior,
transcending it by his will and creative prowess") are "profoundly
dehumanizing, no matter how good the product."68 Designing babies to
have disabilities might be particularly objectionable on this view.
The Non-Identity Problem is no obstacle to this kind of argument
because the victim is not the resulting child but all of society who suffers
the supposed dulling of sensibilities. This kind of argument, which is
frequently offered in areas such as commercial surrogacy69 and physician-
assisted suicide7" is, of course, very controversial, and open to all sorts of
challenges. For example, what is the likelihood that the change in
sensibilities will occur? What is the mechanism? What is the argument in
the first place for maintaining the norm that is threatened? It may be that
the form of the argument I have drawn from Kass is particularly
susceptible to challenge, but evaluating that argument is not my purpose
here; rather, I merely want to show that such an argument offers a reason
for concluding that the parents have acted wrongfully in the intentional
diminishment case that does not run afoul of the Non-Identity Problem.
Modified-experience arguments are usually operationalized by
criminal prohibition-for example the decision of some jurisdictions to
criminalize commercial surrogacy and bestiality-because that form of
liability is thought to carry the strongest expressive message. Concluding
that intentional diminishment was wrong based on this view would give a
reason to prohibit it criminally. Some tort scholars have suggested that
tort law can also serve this function," but this seems more likely as a
supplementary function for tort rather than a primary motivation for it.
C. VIRTUE ETHICS
A different kind of response to the Non-Identity Problem is drawn
from a broadly virtue ethics or aretaic tradition. This tradition suggests
that an action is right if the action is one that a virtuous moral agent
would characteristically perform under the circumstances.7" In The Case
Against Perfection, Michael Sandel offers a virtue ethics style argument
68. Id. at 38-39.
69. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, too HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1933 (1987)
("[In commercial surrogacy w]e must also consider the commodification of children. The risk is serious
indeed, because, if there is a significant domino effect, commodification of some children means
commodification of everyone."); see also Altman, supra note 62, at 297 ("Arguments for making
important decisions based on concern for preserving sensibilities, especially observers' sensibilities,
should be greeted with great caution.").
70. See, e.g., Ken Levy, Gonzales v. Oregon and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Ethical and Policy
Issues, 42 TULSA L. REv. 699, 727-28 nn.124-28 (collecting sources offering this kind of argument).
71. See, e.g., Koenig, supra note 59, at 771-74 (arguing that punitive damages in tort can serve a
similar boundary-setting function that prevents the erosion of social mores).
72. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, AM. J. JuRls. 65, 65-76 (2oo6); Rosalind




against enhancement focusing on the parental virtues.73 For Sandel, the
problem with enhancement "lies in the hubris of the designing parents, in
their drive to master the mystery of birth... it disfigures the relation
between parent and child, and deprives the parent of the humility and
enlarged human sympathies that an openness to the unbidden can
cultivate."74 While Sandel's book is focused on enhancement, the same
arguments can be made as to intentional diminishment-it too is a
negation of the parental virtues, by showing an inappropriate desire of
mastery as to the destiny of the child, and a lack of openness to the
unbidden. Indeed, intentional diminishment might seem like
"unparental" action even more clearly than enhancement, in that in
some cases the parent is choosing to impose a detriment on the child for
the sake of the parent's own happiness or interests.
The Non-Identity Problem poses no obstacle for an argument along
the lines offered by Sandel. For him, like many in the virtue ethics camp,
the character of the agent doing the action is what is central in
determining its wrongfulness.75 Thus, for Sandel, it appears that the
practice of enhancement is wrong even if we grant that a given
enhancement benefits the resulting child. 76 Because the Non-Identity
Problem's power stems from demonstrating the lack of harm to the child,
it is powerless against this kind of argument, which does not depend on
making a claim of harm to the child.77
It is much less clear, however, whether a virtue ethics argument
along the lines offered by Sandel is compatible with legal liability. While
virtue ethics is enjoying something of renaissance in American legal
circles,7s it is somewhat foreign to traditional tort theory which has
73. 1 should stress that the classification of Sandel's argument is mine and not his.
74. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING 46 (2007).
75. See Hurstone, supra note 72; Solum, supra note 72, at 65-76.
76. See SANDEL, supra note 74, at 1-4, 11-19, 94-97 (emphasizing that his argument is distinct
from arguments against enhancement relating to safety, autonomy, or distribution of benefits).
77. Once again, this should not be taken as an endorsement of the position offered by Sandel.
Frances Kamm, for example, has critiqued an earlier version of Sandel's argument for its focus on the
desire for mastery as being the wrong-causing element of enhancement-giving the example of a
scientist who sought to cure blindness not out of compassion but out of a desire for mastery, and
suggesting that we do not think him to have acted immorally-and questioned whether Sandel's
openness to the unbidden would also make it wrong to take steps to prevent natural disasters like
tornados or to cure cancer. See Frances M. Kamm, Is There a Problem with Enhancement?, 5 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 5, 6-9 (2005). In his more recent work, Sandel has tried to accommodate this critique by
suggesting that his point is merely that "the moral stakes in the enhancement debate are not fully
captured by the familiar categories of autonomy and rights, on the one hand, and the calculation of
costs and benefits, on the other. My concern with enhancement is not as individual vice but as a habit
of mind and way of being." SANDEL, supra note 74, at 96.
78. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHIL. 178, 18o-8i (2003) (collecting articles applying virtue ethics to, inter alia, antitrust, civil
rights, corporate, criminal, employment, and environmental law, as well as offering a virtue ethics take
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focused on justice and efficiency.79 While there have been some attempts
at reformulations of tort law to reflect a virtue ethics focus, 80 it is also
quite clearly still at the fringe of current tort thinking.8' A virtue ethics
approach may be slightly more consonant with other forms of legal
liability such as criminal law. A number of authors have suggested that
concern for the character of the perpetrator is a central aspect of criminal
law, 8' and there are certainly categories of crimes (vice crimes such as
gambling and prostitution, for example) where the focus on character is
still closer to the surface. Still, virtue ethics seems far from central as a
ground for making actions criminal in our system.
D. WRONGING WHILE "OVERALL" BENEFITING
A final set of responses to the Non-Identity Problem might suggest
that while the problem correctly demonstrates that we have not "overall"
harmed a resulting child by intentional diminishment, that does not mean
we have not wronged him."3 To give two examples not related to
bioethics, it is sometimes argued that:
[I]f we do not allow a competent adult to make a decision for himself,
we may wrong him, even if he is thereby prevented from doing
something bad to himself. If we do not let a black person on an
airplane because it is segregated, we have wronged him, even if the
plane crashes, and his life is saved by our act."
Professor Shiffrin offers one view of parental liability for procreation
along these lines., Shiffrin rejects the "comparative model" of harm-in
on judging).
79. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1431, 1450-52 (2000).
80. See id. at 1462-66 (arguing for a view of the reasonable person standard in negligence as an
attempt to determine whether the tortfeasor was one who showed the virtues of reasonableness,
prudence, and carefulness).
81. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901,933-34 (2OO1).
82. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, io8 HARV. L. REV. 1423, I423-44 (1995); see
also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 363-64 (2o04).
83. Of course, for consequentialists the Right and the Good are coextensive, what is right is what
maximizes good states of the world. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTCE 19-23 (Rev. ed.
1999); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 3 (1996). Deontologists and other
nonconsequentialists, however, believe in the priority of the Right over the Good, that there may be
actions which promote good states of the world that are nonetheless wrong. See, e.g., RAwLS, supra, at
22-26.
84. Kamm, supra note 31, at 72 (citing James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS
804, 810 (1986)). To be sure, some would object that these examples are explicable within
consequentialism.
85. For others, see, for example, Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an
Open Future, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7, 12 (1997) (arguing that "disabled persons wishing to
reproduce themselves in the form of a disabled child ... violate[] the Kantian principle of treating
each person as an end in herself and never as a means only" because "they define the child as an entity
who exists to fulfill parental hopes and dreams, not her own"); Elizabeth Harman, Can We Harm and
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which harm and benefit represent two sides of the same scale-and its
"principle that one may inflict a lesser harm on someone simply to
benefit him overall, when he is unavailable to give or deny consent.
8 6
She instead endorses an asymmetrical noncomparative approach on
which harm is associated with noncomparative absolutely bad states such
as broken limbs, disabilities, death, significant pain, etc., and benefit is
associated with foods such as material advantage, sensual pleasure, goal
fulfillment, etc. 7 Shiffrin then distinguishes between two types of
benefits, those that represent the "removal from or prevention of harm,"
and a residual category she terms "pure benefits." ' She argues for a
principle that it is permissible to inflict a lesser harm to remove or
prevent a greater harm, but wrong to do so in order to confer a pure
benefit. 9
For some cases both her view and the comparative view produce the
same result. To use Joel Feinberg's example, when a rescuer must break
the arm of an unconscious person (who therefore cannot consent) in
order to save him, the comparative view suggests the action is right
because the individual has been overall benefited, the harm of the
broken arm is outweighed by the benefit of being saved; on Shiffrin's
view the action is also permissible because the harm of the broken arm is
outweighed by the benefit of avoiding a greater harm.'
In some cases, however, the two views diverge. Shiffrin uses the
fanciful hypothetical of a wealthy inhabitant of an island, "Wealthy,"
who cannot set foot on another island nor communicate with its
inhabitants. 9' The other island's inhabitants are comfortably well-off, but
Benefit in Creating?, i8 PHIL. PERSP. 89, 93 (2OO4) (arguing that "an action harms a person if the action
causes pain, early death, bodily damage, or deformity to her, even if she would not have existed if the
action had not been performed," and "reasons against harm are so morally serious that the mere
presence of greater benefits to those harmed is not in itself sufficient to render the harms permissible:
when there is an alternative in which parallel benefits can be provided without parallel harms, the
harming action is wrong"); F.M. Kamm, Baselines and Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1367, 1385
(2OO3) ("[Clreators owe their creations, at reasonable cost, certain things that I call the 'minima'
[which] involve more than just things that make lives barely worth living[, such that] I do not think that
giving half a loaf, as distinct from giving a whole loaf and then taking half away, is permissible if the
half a loaf falls below the minima."); Woodward, supra note 84, at 813-21 (arguing from a principle
that "it can be wrong to adopt a course of action which will both bring certain obligations into
existence and make failure to meet them unavoidable, even though this course of action affects
another's overall interests as favorably as any other course of action would").
86. Shiffrin, supra note I, at 119-22, 131-34. I will not do Shiffrin's incredibly interesting
argument full justice in this short recap, omitting, inter alia, her discussion of an objection from
hypothetical consent and built-in compensation.
87. Id. at 120-25.
88. Id. at 124-25.
89. Id. at 125-27.
9o. Id. at 123-27 (citing JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 5
(994)).
9I. Id. at 127-28 (setting out the full hypothetical).
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Wealthy desires to make them richer. The only way for Wealthy to do
this, in Shiffrin's hypothetical, is to drop gold bullion cubes of five million
dollars value each from his airplane while passing over the island
knowing there is some risk he may hurt someone. Most people are
delighted by the gold drop, but one person, "Unlucky," is hit by a falling
cube and his arm is broken. If Unlucky thinks that all things considered
he has been benefited since the cost of repairing his arm is less than five
million dollars (though he is unsure whether he would have consented ex
ante to the risk) then, on the comparative view the action is right-a
harm has been inflicted to produce an overall benefit. On Shiffrin's view,
however, the action was wrong, because harm was inflicted without prior
consent to bestow only a "pure benefit," not the avoidance of greater
harm, and therefore Wealthy owes compensation to Unlucky for that
harm.9"
Shiffrin then extends the idea to wrongful life cases, but we can
apply her analysis to the case of intentional diminishment. She argues
that no one is harmed by not being created, such that being born confers
on the child a pure benefit but not the avoidance of harm.93 In intentional
diminishment cases, the parents have without prior consent imposed a
harm (deafness) on the child not to avoid a greater harm, but to bestow a
pure benefit. Therefore, they have acted wrongly even though they have
benefited the child overall.
Once again, my intention is not to offer a full evaluation of this
argument, but to demonstrate how it avoids the Non-Identity Problem,
and to interrogate its suitability as a ground for legal liability. Shiffrin's
position evades the Non-Identity Problem by revealing that the problem
holds sway only on the comparative view-its power comes from the fact
that we think a child with a life worth living has been overall benefited by
being born, but on Shiffrin's view overall benefit is not the touchstone
for right action, what matters is avoiding imposing harm unless one is
doing so to avoid a greater harm.
Is Shiffrin's view a suitable basis for tort liability in intentional
diminishment cases? Shiffrin thinks this provides a compelling basis for
tort liability in wrongful life cases (and thus we can extend it to
intentional diminishment cases), where the children should be able to sue
for the harm inflicted even if it was offset by the bestowal of a pure
benefit.94 But is this distinction between pure benefits and the avoidance
of or protection from harm one that is compatible with tort law more
generally? As the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests, where
"equitable," we treat the fact that the tortious action "conferred upon
92. Id.
93. Id. at i19-2o. One (deep) open question is whether being created is a benefit at all.
94. Id. at 117-19, 135.
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the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed" as a
mitigation of the damages caused.95 At the same time the Restatement
does not adopt the "anything goes" attitude towards mitigation that
would seem to follow from the comparative approach (and the Non-
Identity Problem). While the Restatement does not constrain using
Shiffrin's pure benefit versus harm avoidance distinction, it does
constrain using the same interest test, explaining in the Comments that
"[d]amages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not diminished
by showing that another interest has been benefited, ' ,96 and illustrating,
inter alia, by suggesting that in a case of false imprisonment with
damages claimed for pain, humiliation, and physical harm, the fact that
the victim is later able to sell his story to the newspapers and make large
sums of money is not mitigative.97 While quite different from Shiffrin's
constraint, perhaps the Restatement's constraints on the mitigation
doctrine opens the door sufficiently to suggest some compatibility of her
views with tort law. 95 This argument might also draw on other literature
suggesting separate spheres of valuation and their incommensurability99
to claim that tort law should not permit the offsetting of the benefit of
existence against the harm of deafness."°
A problem with Shiffrin's argument is that it threatens to prove too
much in the way of tort liability, in that she thinks that in theory tort
liability ought to lie not only in the exceptional case of wrongful life but
in the normal case of general procreation, because even in the normal
case the child "must endure the fairly substantial amount of pain,
suffering, difficulty, significant disappointment, distress, and significant
loss that occurs within the typical life," harms that are imposed without
consent only to bestow a pure benefit (existence)."' One possibility
Shiffrin suggests (but does not commit to) is that this does not make
procreation wrong per se, but only makes it wrong "to procreate without
undertaking the commitment to share or alleviate any burdens the future
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
96. Id. cmt. b.
97. Id. illus. 6.
98. Shiffrin suggests her view may challenge the Restatement or give a "constrained reading of
what constitutes equitable mitigation." Shiffrin, supra note I, at 13o n.30.
99. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE I-IO (1983); see also Brock, supra note 9;
Cohen, supra note 62, at 696-703.
too. Another possible way to achieve a rapprochement of this kind of argument (whether Shiffrin's
version or another) with tort law might be to group intentional diminishment with the "dignitary"
torts, such as false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and offensive battery, for which we recognize
tort liability even in the absence of a showing of harm to the individual. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 42 (2oOI) (discussing these torts). Whether such an approach succeeds would depend on
the viability of a claim that those torts are best seen as cases where someone has been wronged
without being harmed (in the sense of setback of interests) rather than cases where someone has been
harmed without being physically harmed.
roi. Shiffrin, supra note I, at 137-39.
December 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
child endures," and that in the normal case this duty is discharged by
participation in child rearing and child support."' Thus, while
theoretically tort suits by children against parents ought to be available
in even the case of normal procreation, "[w]e need not, and standardly
do not, provide judicial relief for all moral claims," such that in the
normal procreation cases it may be that the ordinary duties of support
make these suits unnecessary and "might justify limiting wrongful life
causes of action to those children who suffer disproportionately great
burdens." ' 3 She also suggests that the argument for liability is strongest
for parents who behaved negligently in imposing these special risks,"'
and thus it ought to be very strong for intentional diminishment where
we have not only negligence but intentional action.
If one were to reject Shiffrin's characterization of the usual
difficulties of life as "harms,"' 5 it may be possible to recast her argument
as giving a reason to find intentional diminishment wrongful without
entailing that all procreation is prima facie wrongful.
CONCLUSION
Smolensky's project is to try and determine whether there is room
for legal liability (specifically in tort) against parents who intentionally
diminish their children using assisted reproductive technology given
Parfit's Non-Identity Problem. In this Article I have tried to further this
project in two ways.
First, I have suggested some problems with her attempt to exempt
cases of intentional diminishment done through genetic manipulation
from the no-liability conclusion she reaches as to cases where it is done
by selection. I have shown why I find problematic the specific arguments
she offers and more generally why I am skeptical that this entire
approach is a workable one for law.
The more constructive element has been to suggest that even when
the Non-Identity Problem applies it may not be a bar to legal liability. I
have set out four kinds of approaches drawn from the bioethics literature
that suggest that the parents have acted wrongfully by engaging in
intentional diminishment notwithstanding the Non-Identity Problem. I
have then tentatively evaluated whether any of these approaches would
102. Id. at 139.
103. Id. at 142.
104. Id. at 143.
105. Frances Kamm has questioned Shiffrin's treating "as problems or being in a harmed state
some of the very things that give value to human life, such as moral consciousness," and expressed her
worry that "Shiffrin's argument would lead one to conclude that creating creatures incapable of moral
choice, never in pain, and unaware of truths such as the prospect of death, like extremely happy, long-
lived rabbits who have no other problems, would be preferable to creating human persons as they are
now." Kamm, supra note 85, at 1384.
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give rise to legal liability, and what form that liability would take. To
recap, non-person-affecting principles (in same number cases) seem an
unlikely basis for legal liability at all. When the other-person-affecting
approach takes the form of a third-party-effects-based argument, it
might serve as a basis for criminal liability, some kinds of government
actions or private attorney general actions, tort suits by third parties, and
possibly a tort suit by the child (depending in part on how far we are
willing to extend the boundaries of tort beyond the archetypal case of
harm to the plaintiff). When the argument takes the modified-experience
or corruption form, criminal liability seems like the better fit. While
some argue that virtue ethics-based arguments can form the basis for
criminal and tort liability, this is still very much a fringe position,
especially on the tort side. Finally, arguments premised on the idea that
one can wrong another while overall benefiting him might form a basis for
tort liability, though it will depend on how much flexibility there is in
determining whether tort-produced benefits are mitigative here.
Throughout this discussion I have more or less bracketed the
normative question about whether any of these approaches themselves
offer a sound account of why we should treat intentional diminishment as
wrongful. That analysis would depend both on an evaluation of more
general moral theory commitments (e.g., consequentialism versus
nonconsequentialism) and the specific instantiation of each kind of
argument (e.g., while I have focused on Shiffrin's wronging-while-
overall-benefiting-type argument, there are a number of other specific
versions of this approach). This evaluation seems to me the next step in
the intriguing project Smolensky has begun.
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